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Abstract
We construct a panel of eBay seller histories and examine the im-
portance of eBay’s reputation mechanism. We find that, when a seller
first receives negative feedback, his weekly sales rate drops from a pos-
itive 7% to a negative 7%; subsequent negative feedback ratings arrive
25% more rapidly than the first one and don’t have nearly as much
impact as the first one. We also find that a seller is more likely to exit
the lower his reputation is; and that, just before exiting, sellers receive
more negative feedback than their lifetime average.
We consider a series of theoretical models and measure them against
these empirical results. Regardless of which theoretical model best ex-
plains the data, an important conclusion of our paper is that eBay’s
reputation system gives way to noticeable strategic responses from both
buyers and sellers.
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1 Introduction
Electronic commerce presents the theoretical and the empirical economist with
a number of interesting research questions. Traditional markets rely signifi-
cantly on the trust created by repeated interaction and personal relationships.
Electronic markets, by contrast, tend to be rather more anonymous. Can the
same level of trust and efficiency be obtained in these markets?
One possible solution, exemplified by eBay auctions, is to create reputation
mechanisms that allow traders to identify and monitor each other. In this
paper, we focus on the workings of the eBay reputation mechanism. We present
some empirical evidence regarding the dynamics of eBay seller reputations; and
discuss possible theory implications.
Our focus on eBay’s reputation mechanism is justified for two reasons.
First, electronic commerce in general and eBay in particular are a significant
economic phenomenon: in 2004, more than $34.1bn were transacted on eBay
by more than one hundred million users.1 Second, with its well defined rules
and available information, eBay presents the researcher with a fairly controlled
environment for theory testing. Specifically, a reasonable assumption on eBay
is that the information one trader has about other traders is the same as the
researcher’s. Essentially, this information consists of a series of positive and
negative feedback comments given by past trading partners. In this context,
we can make sharper predictions about agent behavior than in other markets,
in particular in markets where buyers and sellers share information that is not
observed by the researcher.
A number of authors have conducted empirical studies of eBay’s repu-
tation mechanism. Almost all of these prior studies focus on the buyer re-
sponse to published feedback aggregates. In particular, a large number of
studies estimate cross-sectional regressions of sale prices on seller feedback
characteristics: Dewan and Hsu (2001), Eaton (2002), Ederington and De-
wally (2003), Houser and Wooders (2003), Kalyanam and McIntyre (2003),
Livingston (2002), Lucking-Reiley, Bryan, Prasad and Reeves (2000), McDon-
ald and Slawson (2002), Melnik and Alm (2002), Resnick and Zeckhauser
(2001).2 Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson and Lockwood (2003) point out the
1Although eBay started in the U.S., it is rapidly becoming a European and worldwide
phenomenon. In the second quarter of 2005, 46% of eBay’s revenue originated from non-
U.S. operations. According to Nielsen, eBay is the leading e-commerce site in Germany,
UK, France and Italy.
2See Dellarocas (2002), Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson and Lockwood (2003), and Bajari
and Hortac¸su (2004) for surveys of these results.
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potential for a significant omitted variable bias in these cross-sectional regres-
sions, and conduct a controlled field experiment in which a seasoned seller sells
identical postcards using his real name and an assumed name. They find an
8% premium to having 2000 positive feedbacks and 1 negative over a feedback
profile with 10 positive comments and no negatives. Ba and Pavlou (2002)
conduct a laboratory experiment in which subjects are asked to declare their
valuations for experimenter generated profiles, and find a positive response to
better profiles. Jin and Kato (2004) assess whether the reputation mechanism
is able to combat fraud by purchasing ungraded baseball cards with seller-
reported grades, and having them evaluated by the official grading agency.
They report that while having a better seller reputation is a positive indicator
of honesty, reputation premia or discounts in the market do not fully com-
pensate for expected losses due to seller dishonesty. Finally, there are also a
number of papers on reputation in markets other than eBay, including Jin and
Leslie (2004). We will return to this later.
We start our empirical investigation by estimating a cross-section regres-
sion of the impact of reputation on price. We find that a 1% level increase
in the fraction of negative feedback is correlated with a 9% decrease in price.
However, we find the estimates have a relatively low level of statistical signif-
icance. These results are comparable with previous research, both in terms of
coefficient size and in terms of statistical significance.
Our next step is to go beyond cross-section regression and estimate the
effects of reputation based on panel data. To do so, we assume that: (a)
the frequency of buyer feedback is a good proxy for the frequency of actual
transactions; (b) the nature of the feedback is a good proxy for the degree
of buyer satisfaction. We provide statistical tests that suggest the likelihood
of feedback is uncorrelated with a variety of seller characteristics, thus giving
credence to our strategy of using feedback histories as proxies for transactions
histories. We are thus able to construct a data panel of seller histories. These
seller histories allow us to look not only at how buyers react to changes in
reputation but also at how sellers potentially “game” the system.
We find that, when a seller first receives negative feedback, his weekly
sales rate drops from a positive 7% to a negative 7%. Moreover, subsequent
negative feedback ratings arrive 25% more rapidly than the first one and don’t
have nearly as much impact as the first one. We also find that a seller is more
likely to exit the lower his reputation is; and that, just before exiting, sellers
receive more negative feedback than their lifetime average. Finally, a typical
seller starts his career as a buyer (that is, will make more transactions as a
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buyer than as a seller).
Our data clearly suggests that reputation matters: buyers react to infor-
mation about seller reputation; and sellers’ actions, too, are influenced by
reputation considerations.
We then propose a theoretical framework that squares with key empirical
observations in our dataset. We consider a model in the tradition of Kreps et al
(1982), featuring adverse selection and moral hazard. In equilibrium, a seller
with a perfect record puts a lot of effort into maintaining that record. Once a
negative is received, the marginal return to investing in reputation decreases
dramatically. As a result, the seller (if a low type) decreases effort. Lower
effort leads to lower quality transactions; and this in turn leads to a higher
likelihood of negative transactions (and negative feedback). In this way, our
model is consistent with our observations regarding sales rate and frequency
of negative feedback.
Our main contribution to the study of online reputation mechanisms is
twofold: First, we analyze panel data in addition to cross-section data. Second,
we analyze the impact of seller reputation on buyer and seller behavior. We
next discuss our perceived relevance of these contributions.
We believe that the difference between panel and cross-section data is im-
portant. In fact, consistently with previous literature, our cross-section results
show weak statistical significance. By contrast, our results from panel data are
typically much more significant, both economically and statistically. We thus
agree with Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson and Lockwood’s (2003) conjecture
that there is significant unobservable seller heterogeneity.
To the best of our knowledge, together with Jin and Kato (2004) on baseball
card sellers and Jin and Leslie (2004) on L.A. restaurants, ours is one of the
first empirical papers to study the relation between seller’s reputation and
seller’s actions. In fact, we believe ours is the first study to look at the lifetime
dynamics of sellers’ reputation: how a reputation is built and how it is used;
how sellers make choices to influence their reputation; and how sellers react
to changes in their reputation.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe the
institutional setup of eBay, in particular the mechanics of its reputation mech-
anism. In Section 3, we describe our dataset. The main empirical results
are presented in Section 4, whereas Section 5 develops a series os possible
theoretical interpretations. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2 The eBay reputation mechanism
Since its launch in 1995, eBay has become the dominant online auction site,
with millions of items changing hands every day. We will not attempt a de-
tailed account of how eBay has evolved and what its trading rules are; the
interested reader may find this in a number of survey articles and in the pop-
ular press.3 For the purposes of our analysis, it will not be too inaccurate to
characterize eBay’s auction mechanism as a variant of the second-price auc-
tion.4
eBay does not deliver goods: it acts purely as an intermediary through
which sellers can post auctions and buyers bid. eBay obtains its revenue
from seller fees, based on a complex schedule that include fees for starting
an auction and fees on successfully completed auctions.5 Most importantly,
to enable reputation mechanisms to regulate trade, eBay uses an innovative
feedback system.6 After an auction is completed, both the buyer and the seller
can give the other party a grade of +1 (positive), 0 (neutral), or −1 (negative),
along with any textual comments.7
eBay displays several aggregates of the grades received by each seller and
buyer, including (a) the difference between the number of positive and negative
feedback ratings, (b), the percentage of positive feedback ratings (since March,
2001), (c) the date when the seller registered with eBay, and (d) a summary
of the most recent feedback received by the seller.8 Finally, eBay provides
a complete record of the comments received by each seller, starting with the
most recent ones.
All of the information regarding each seller is publicly available. Hence, as
3See Cohen (2002) for an entertaining historical account of eBay. Survey articles on
Internet auctions include Lucking-Reiley (1999), Dellarocas (2003), and Bajari and Hortac¸su
(2004).
4In reality eBay auctions are dynamic auctions in which bidders place (possibly multiple)
“proxy bids” indicating their maximum willingness-to-pay. See Roth and Ockenfels (2002),
Ockenfels and Roth (2003), and Bajari and Hortac¸su (2003) for detailed analyzes of dynamic
bidding behavior on eBay.
5Success is defined as a bid above the minimum bid or a secret reserve price set by the
seller. eBay collects its fee even if the physical transaction does not take place.
6eBay does offer an escrow service for use with especially valuable goods, though this
service is used for only a small fraction of the transactions.
7There have been several changes on eBay regarding how these ratings can be given by
the users. Since 1999, each grade/comment has to be linked to a particular transaction on
eBay. Typically, eBay stores transactions data (in particular price) only for 90 days; hence,
this restricts the extent of “historical research” that a buyer can conduct.
8Indicators (b) and (c) have only been presented since March 1, 2003.
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claimed in the introduction, this is an environment where the economic analyst
has the same information that a new buyer has about a seller.9 We will thus
take this informational equivalence as given when formulating our theoretical
model and its empirical implications.
3 Data description
Our data was collected from eBay’s website at monthly intervals between Oc-
tober 24, 2002 and March 16, 2003. We focused our attention on auctions of
(arguably) ex-ante homogenous goods to minimize the impact of object-level
heterogeneity, but we also wanted to capture possible sources of variation
across objects with different characteristics. Hence we collected transaction
level information on the following objects (displayed in Figure 1):10
1. Collectible coins. We chose this category since the collectible coin market
is one of the most active segments on eBay and several previous studies of
eBay auctions have looked at this market.11 We selected at two different
kinds of coins: the 1/10 oz. 5 dollar gold coin of 2002 vintage (gold
American Eagle); and the 2001 silver proof set (ten coins of different
denominations), both produced by the U.S. mint.12 The average sale
prices in our data set are $50 for the gold coin $78 for the proof set.
2. IBM Thinkpad T23 PIII notebook computers. We chose this category
because, according to the FBI’s online fraud investigation unit, most
customer complaints regarding online auction fraud arise from laptop
auctions. We further chose this object because, while notebook comput-
ers tend to come in many different configurations (regarding memory,
disk space, peripherals, screen size), this particular IBM model seemed
to have relatively minor differences in configuration compared to other
manufacturers. The average sale price of the Thinkpad T23’s in our data
set was $580.
9Of course, “old” buyers may know about private transactions that they did not comment
on.
10eBay stores data on completed auctions for 30 days. We attempted to get data from all
completed auctions in the above period.
11Bajari and Hortac¸su (2003), Melnik and Alm (2002) and Lucking-Reiley, Prasad and
Reeves (2000).
12An important difference between these two types of coins is that, while the proof set is
in mint condition (and preserved in a plastic container), the gold coin may come in various
grades. In our data, we found three different ones: MS–70, MS–69 and MS–67, in decreasing
order of value.
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3. 1998 Holiday Teddy Beanie Babies, produced by the Ty toy company.
Beanie babies are a popular collectors’ item on eBay, and according to
the FBI’s Internet Fraud unit comprise the second largest source of fraud
complaints on online auctions. This is the least expensive item in our
data set, with an average sale price of $10.7.
Along with transaction-level data, we collected data from each seller’s feed-
back page, as shown in Figure 2, thus recording the seller’s entire sequence of
reviews. We should note that transaction-level data (price, object description,
number of bidders, etc) is only available during 30 days. Therefore, while we
had access to that data during the six-month period of data collection, our his-
torical record for each seller only includes the feedback comments. Moreover,
it is quite possible that the sellers we classify as beanie-baby sellers (because
they sold beanie babies during the data collection period) actually sold differ-
ent objects in the past.
A key assumption in our analysis is that the likelihood of buyer feedback is
approximately constant (at least within object category). We discuss evidence
supporting this assumption at the end of Section 4.1. Accordingly, we take
the number of feedback comments as a proxy for the number of past sales and
refer to a large seller as one with many feedback comments.
Seller characteristics. Table 1 provides some summary statistics on
seller size. The average seller in our sample had 1625 total feedback responses.
The median seller had 397. The largest seller has 52,298 feedback responses,
the smallest 0 (i.e., is yet to be rated, even though at least one sale took place).
We found the distribution of seller sizes (proxied by number of feedback points
they got) to be approximately lognormal. Sellers were largest in the market
for Thinkpads, followed by teddies, gold coins and the proof sets.
While the mean and median seller in our sample is quite large (in terms
of transactions conducted), the number of negative comments is rather small.
As can be seen from column (2) of Table 1, the average seller in our sample
has 4.9 negative feedback points, corresponding to 0.9% of all comments. The
maximum number of negative feedbacks received by a seller is 819, but this
seller took part in 52,298 transactions. Also notice that the median seller in
our sample has only one negative; more than a quarter of the sellers have no
negative comments.13
13Some negative comments for sellers have the following textual content: “THIS PERSON
RIPPED ME OFF, SENT SHODDY ITEM INSTEAD OF ITEM LISTED,” “Sold product
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Figure 1: Pictures of auctioned objects considered in this study: the 1/10 oz.
5 dollar gold coin of 2002 vintage (gold American Eagle) and the 2001 silver
proof set (ten coins of different denominations), both produced by the U.S.
mint; the IBM Thinkpad T23 PIII notebook computer; and the 1998 Holiday
Teddy Beanie Baby.
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Figure 2: Feedback page of user wsb5.
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Table 1: Distribution of feedback aggregates across sellers.
Number of Number of Number of N/(N + P )
Positives Negatives Neutrals (entire history)
Mean 1,625 4.9 7.2 0.009
Std. Dev. 3,840 25.1 33.5 0.038
Min. 0 0 0 0
Max. 52,298 651 654 1
1% 0 0 0 0
5% 5 0 0 0
10% 18 0 0 0
25% 99 0 0 0
50% 397 1 1 0.0028
75% 1,458 3 4 0.0092
90% 4,361 9 13 0.021
95% 7,134 19 29 0.034
99% 15,005 52 86 0.068
N 819 819 819 795
One issue regarding the interpretation of comments is whether neutral com-
ments are closer to positives or to negatives. Our subjective impression, af-
ter browsing through eBay community chatboards where users discuss issues
regarding the feedback system, is that the information contained in a neu-
tral rating is perceived by users to be much closer to negative feedback than
positive. Indeed, observe that in Table 1 the distributions of neutrals and
negatives across sellers are extremely similar. The average seller received 7.2
neutral comments in her lifetime, with a median of 1 (as in the case of negative
feedback). Given this striking similarity, we will henceforth lump negative and
neutral comments together when referring to “negative” feedback.
he didn’t have! Will not send refund! I am filing charges! No ansr,” “Overgraded junk. Does
not respond to emails. An irresponsible seller. Avoid him.” On the other hand, we found
that more than 40% of the positive comments contain the expression “A+”. Some more
colorful positive comments were: “Heaven must be missing an angel! Transaction couldn’t
be better! Thank U!!!” and “Mega cool mad phat deal nasty crazy cool even. Thanks.”
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4 Empirical results
In this section, we present our main empirical findings. They are divided into
five subsections. In Section 4.1, we present the results from our cross-section
regressions of price on reputation measures. The remaining subsections are
based on our data panel. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3 we study the impact of
the first few negative feedback ratings in a seller’s history: impact on growth
(Section 4.2) and impact on the frequency of negative feedback (Section 4.3).
Section 4.4 looks at seller exit: who is more likely to exit and what pattern
of feedback do we observe near exit time. Finally, Section 4.5 examines the
relative pattern of purchases and sales over a seller’s lifetime.
4.1 Reputation and price
At the most basic level, we would expect a better seller reputation to influence
the price paid by buyers for an otherwise identical object. To investigate this
hypothesis, several papers in the prior empirical literature on eBay have run
regressions of the form:14
price = β(reputation measure) + γ(other demand factors) + .
Since we have data for a series of auctions across four homogeneous product
categories, we follow the literature by running similar cross-sectional regres-
sions.
Table 2 reports our results from such cross-sectional regressions. In these
regressions, the dependent variable is the log of the highest bid registered in
the auction.15 Hence the coefficient estimates can be interpreted (approxi-
mately) as percentage changes in price. The regression in column (1) allows
for heteroskedasticity across object classes and controls for object dummies.
The coefficient on the percentage of negatives in a seller’s feedback history is
negative and implies that a one point increase in this percentage (at the mean
value, from 1% to 2%) leads to a 7.5% decline in sale price. The coefficient
on the total number of transaction reviews (divided by 1000) received by the
seller is positive (but not significant at conventional levels), and implies that
1000 additional reviews is associated with a 5% increase in sale price.
Observe that the magnitude of this estimate is close to the findings of
several other cross-sectional studies. In particular, the 5% price premium
14For surveys of these papers, see Bajari and Hortac¸su (2003), Resnick et al. (2003)
15According to eBay rules this is equal to the second highest bid plus the bid increment.
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Table 2: Cross sectional regressions. Dependent variable: log of highest bid.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Negative comments -7.54 -7.54 0.68 5.16
(2.51)* (9.88) (6.81) (7.75)
# Feedbacks 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.03)* (0.00) (0.00)
% Neg. comm. after format change -15.80
(7.83)**
# Feedbacks after format change 0.00
(0.01)
Indicator for new format -0.26
(0.13)**
Indicator for ”hdoutlet” 4.81 4.80
(0.43)*** (0.43)***
Listing includes photo -0.18 -0.18 -0.04 -0.04
(0.05)** (0.14) (0.10) (0.10)
Refurbished item -0.62 -0.61 -2.43 -2.45
(0.91) (1.06) (0.66)*** (0.64)***
Paypal accepted 0.17 0.17 -0.05 -0.06
(0.21) (0.18) (0.09) (0.09)
Credit cards accepted 0.36 0.36 0.29 0.28
(0.23) (0.10)*** (0.10)*** (0.10)***
Auction duration (days) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.02)** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
Peak hour 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.03
(0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
American Eagle 0.52 0.52 0.91 0.94
(0.08)*** (0.51) (0.50)* (0.50)*
Mint Set 0.84 0.84 1.21 1.23
(0.05)*** (0.49)* (0.48)** (0.48)**
Beanie Baby -1.04 -1.04 -0.50 -0.48
(0.10)*** (0.53)* (0.50) (0.50)
log(Minimum Bid) 0.003 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Constant 2.468 2.47 2.05 2.64
(0.664)** (0.63)*** (0.62)*** (0.54)***
Observations 1053 1053 1053 1053
R-squared 0.42 0.42 0.52 0.53
Notes: 1. Day of week and calendar week controls are added in all
specifications.
2. In columns 2-4, robust standard errors (clustered by seller id) are
reported in parentheses.
3. Significance levels: 10, 5, 1 percent (one to three stars).
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implied by 1000 additional reviews is comparable to the 8% premium found
by the field experiment of Resnick et al. (2003), which compared sales prices
obtained by a seller ID with 2000 positive comments (and 1 negative), and a
seller with about 15 positive comments (and zero negatives).
However, as first pointed out by Resnick et al. (2003), several unobservable
confounding factors may render a “causal” interpretation of the reputation
measure difficult. For example, sellers with better reputation measures may
also be much better at providing accurate and clear descriptions of the items
they are selling; hence their writing ability, and not their reputation, may be
underlying the higher prices they are receiving.
The next set of results reported in Table 2 enable us to get a feel for the
importance of such confounding factors in cross-sectional price regressions. In
column (2), we adjust the standard errors by allowing for correlation in the
error term within a seller. This adjustment leads to the coefficient on the
percentage of negatives being no longer statistically significant (though the
coefficient on total number of reviews becomes significant). Column (3) pro-
vides even more clear evidence that unobservable factors may be at work. In
this regression, we include a dummy variable for the auctions run by hdoutlet,
the dominant seller (with close to 50% market share) in the Thinkpad mar-
ket. This leads to the economic and statistical significance of the percentage
of negatives and the length of the transaction record to disappear entirely,
implying that the comparison of auctions of this seller vis-a-vis other, much
smaller sellers, drives much of the finding in column (1).
The results in column (2) and column (3) suggest that factors other than
differences across sellers transaction histories may affect the cross-sectional
variation in prices; and it may be difficult for an econometrician to account for
these factors since the econometrician is typically not a very knowledgeable
buyer in these markets. In fact, a few of the other coefficient estimates in
Table 2 also suggest that factors other than reputation scores play a larger
role in the cross-sectional variation of prices. For example, the presence of the
word “refurbished”, or whether the seller allowed payment by a credit card is
correlated with large variations in price.
In summary, the results in the first three columns of Table 2 suggest,
at best, a rather weak cross-sectional correlation between sale price and the
reputation measures that eBay publishes.
One way to strengthen the case for a causal connection between cross-
sectional variation in reputation and sale price is to exploit an exogenous
change in reputation measures which is not correlated with the way sellers
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prepare their listings. We exploit the following exogenous change in eBay’s
website format: before March 1st, 2003, bidders would only see the seller’s
overall (net positive) feedback points next to the seller’s name. On March 1st,
2003, eBay began to display the percentage of positive comments received by
the seller, as well as the date when the seller registered on eBay (see Figure
2).16
In column (4) of Table 2, we find that the interaction of the percentage
of negatives with a dummy variable for the format change implies that the
response of prices became more negative after the format change.17 According
to the regression results, the economic effect of a 1% increase in negative feed-
back was a 5% change in price before the format change (but insignificant),
and a −15% change after the format change. This suggests that bidders did
not utilize the “percentage” information (presumably due to information ac-
quisition and processing costs) before the format change, but began to utilize
it after the information became freely available. As one might expect, the co-
efficient estimate on the total number of feedbacks of the seller is no different
when interacted with the format change, since eBay displayed this information
before and after the format change.18
Is feedback an exogenous process? The remainder of our empirical
analysis in this section will be founded on the assumption that the frequency
of feedback is a good proxy for the frequency of transactions. One way to test
this assumption is to uncover the determinants of feedback giving, namely
whether there are systematic patters related to the seller’s type.
Specifically, to test whether feedback-giving is an exogenous event, we took
the transactions we used in our price regressions, and matched them with
our feedback data. We found that 40.7% of these transactions resulted in
a feedback,19 with 3 negatives and 3 neutrals (i.e. 1.4% of feedbacks were
16We found out about this policy change by accident. We should point out that before
March 1st, 2003, the information shown in Figure 2 was already available to bidders. How-
ever, in order to see the fraction of seller’s negative comments, the bidder would have to
click on the seller’s highlighted username (which would take the bidder to a new “feedback
profile” page) and manually compute the ratio N/(N + P ).
17This regression corrects standard errors by allowing for heteroskedasticity at the seller
level. We also added a dummy variable for hdoutlet. Omission of either of these features
lead to significance of the coefficient at higher levels.
18Strictly speaking, eBay reports the overall positive feedback score, which is slightly
different from the total number of feedbacks. However, the correlation between the two
measures is 0.96.
19Resnick and Zeckhauser (2001), using a different data sample in which they match
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non-positive). We then ran a regression of the binary outcome of receiving a
feedback on seller characteristics, along with dummies for object types.
Our results show that seller characteristics such as seller’s total transac-
tions, percentage of negative feedback and percentage of negative feedback in
most recent 6 month period do not have a statistically significant correlation
with feedback reception.20 There are differences across object categories in the
frequency of feedback reception (the eagle and mintset coins are more likely
to receive feedback than beanies and Thinkpads), but this most likely reflects
different social norms across different categories.
In sum, we are fairly confident that frequency of feedback provides a good
proxy for frequency of transactions. In the next subsections, we will use this
device to create a panel data of transactions. The idea is that at any moment
in time when seller i makes a trade we have access to all of his or her feedback
history, and by approximation to all of his or her transactions history. One
disadvantage of this approach is that we lose all price data: all we have re-
garding past transactions is feedback (if it was given), nothing else. The main
advantage is that we may correct for seller specific effects and obtain stronger
correlations. The panel data approach also allows us to study the lifetime
patterns of sellers: when and why they exit and how the relative importance
of purchases and sales evolves over time.
4.2 Negative feedback and sales
We now use our panel data on sellers’ feedback records. We begin in this
subsection by examining the impact of negative feedback on the seller’s sales
rate. Our typical seller receives his first negative during the early stages of
his career. During this period, sales rates are typically increasing over time.
Accordingly, we averaged the weekly sales rates over a four week window be-
fore and after the week in which the seller got his first, second, third, fourth
and fifth negative feedback.21 We then conducted paired t-tests of the null
hypothesis of equality of growth rates before and after the negative feedback
event.22
transactions with feedback data, estimate this probability at approximately 50%.
20Detailed results are available upon request.
21For many sellers, longer evaluation periods would include subsequent negative feedback.
We believe a four-week window is a good balance between avoiding loss of data and statistical
significance.
22Many times, when an eBay seller receives a negative comment, there is a “war of words”
between the seller and the buyer who places the negative. During this “war of words,” the
two parties can give several negatives to each other within a period of two or three days. We
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Table 3: Impact of negatives on sales growth (%).
Avg. Week. Object
Growth R. Thinkpad Proof set G. Eagle B. Baby
First Before 7.12 6.85 9.04 14.19
Negat. After −6.76 −7.51 −3.89 −4.28
Difference −13.88*** −14.36*** −12.92*** −18.47***
Std. Error 4.88 3.45 3.58 3.69
N 66 130 95 136
Second Before 3.96 4.50 −0.22 7.68
Negat. After 9.93 8.00 9.47 8.03
Difference +5.97 +3.50 +9.69** +0.36
Std. Error 5.00 5.96 4.82 6.12
N 37 78 70 83
Third Before 9.19 3.80 3.58 2.00
Negat. After 5.28 2.48 −2.09 10.25
Difference −3.90 −1.32 −5.68 +8.24
Std. Error 6.14 3.22 7.44 6.23
N 28 57 52 64
Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels 10, 5, 1 percent
(one to three stars).
2. Weekly growth rates are based on the number of sales-related
feedbacks received by the seller.
3. Growth rate in week t = ln(no. feedbacks in week t) - ln(no.
feedbacks in week t− 1).
4. Weekly growth rates are averaged over 4 week periods taken before
and after the reception of a negative.
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The results, reported in Table 3, are striking: For all four object categories,
the impact of the first negative feedback comment is to slow growth by 14%
a week, from a positive growth rate of about 7% to a negative growth rate
of −7%.23 Moreover, we find this difference is highly statistically significant.
The difference in growth rates before an after the second negative feedback
is positive. However, except for Golden American Eagle, the difference is not
statistically significant. The impact of the third negative feedback also does
not appear to be statistically significant.
Several notes are in order. First, our exercise depends importantly on the
assumption that the probability of feedback is the same before and after a
Negative. However, this is only a problem if buyers are somewhat reluctant to
give positive comments about a seller after the seller has received her first (or
second or third) Negative. Intuition suggests that the opposite is more likely to
be true. Second, our strategy for collecting seller histories retrospectively may
imply a sample bias (we only have data for surviving sellers). In particular,
there may be sellers who exited after receiving the first Negative and are
thus excluded from our sample. But intuition suggests that, if anything, this
reinforces the point that the first Negative has a negative impact on sales.
More importantly, one possible objection is that of endogeneity. For ex-
ample, it may be that expectations of future sale declines result in less service
by the seller, which in turn may lead to worse feedback. Alternatively, there
can be changes in seller quality over time that affect both variables (feedback
and sales) simultaneously. In order to address this possibility, we considered
the natural experiment of the effect of “mistaken” feedback comments.
In a small percentage of cases, buyers mistakenly give a negative rating
when their comment is clearly positive.24 We repeated our analysis of the
impact of negative feedback for this subsample. We considered both first and
second negative feedbacks.
The results are reported in Table 4. Due to the small size of our “mistakes”
sample, we pool together all four object categories.25 Although the exact
excluded the negative comments that sellers received during such episodes, and concentrated
on the timing between de novo negative feedback comments.
23These are the numbers for the Thinkpad. The values for the other products are of
similar magnitude.
24Some examples of comments associated to negative ratings include: “Great to deal
with. . . very fast. . . excellent communication too!” “Good transaction.” “Excellent person
to work with and I would highly recommend! Thanks!” “Received in great shape. Thank
you.” “I received fast and friendly.”
25The first negative results, when broken down by category, are still strongly significant,
and with the correct signs. However, sample sizes are very small in the “second negative”
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Table 4: Impact of negatives on sales growth (%). Subsample of “mistaken”
negative feedback ratings.
Average weekly growth rate
First Before 13.86
Negative After −11.87
Difference −25.74***
Std. Error 7.93
N 41
Second Before 6.34
Negative After 18.03
Difference −11.70
Std. Error 11.76
N 19
Notes: See Table 3.
values are different from the full sample, we still have very large differences,
significant both economically and statistically.
In summary, there is significant evidence that the first negative feedback
has a strong negative impact on the seller’s growth rate; and that subsequent
negative feedback comments have lower or no impact on the sales rate.26 Notice
that the drop in sales rate might correspond either to buyer behavior (fewer
bidders and thus more objects going unsold) or to seller behavior (anticipating
fewer bidders, seller puts fewer objects up for sale). In Section 5 we discuss
various implications of this and other pieces of empirical evidence.
4.3 Frequency of negative feedback
Our second result relates to the frequency of arrival of negative feedback. We
measure “time” in number of sales transactions. As mentioned above, negative
comments often came in the context of a “war of words” between seller and
buyer. To prevent such incidents from biasing our results, we excluded consec-
case.
26As Footnote 2 of Table 3 states, we computed growth rates as differences in logs. When
computed as the ratio (xt+1 − xt)/xt, we obtained different values but the same qualitative
patterns.
17
Table 5: Frequency of negative feedback.
T1: Sale-related feedbacks to first negative.
T2: Sale-related feedbacks between 1st and 2nd negative.
ET: Average number of sale-related feedbacks between negatives.
All Cat. Thinkpad Eagle Mint Teddy
T1 240.88 93.24 339.66 267.71 226.99
T2 188.76 58.59 199.24 261.26 199.86
ET 162.39 50.8 216.1 189.61 163.5
T1 − T2 52.12 34.66 140.41 6.45 27.13
T1 > T2 : p-val 0.021 0.036 0.017 0.452 0.27
T1 − ET 78.48 42.44 123.56 78.09 63.49
T1 > ET: p-val 0.0002 0.0083 0.02 0.025 0.044
T2 − ET 26.36 7.79 -16.86 71.64 36.36
T2 > ET: p-val 0.032 0.176 0.73 0.027 0.089
N 311 58 79 78 96
Notes: 1. Sample includes all sellers with more than 2 negatives received on sales.
2. T-tests are conducted using within seller differences.
3. ET calculated as total feedback/(# negatives & neutrals), where we count
only sales transactions.
utive negative comments by the same buyer. We also excluded any negative
comments that were left within a two-day period after another negative.27 Fi-
nally, we excluded those negative/neutral comments that were received as a
“buyer.”28
Table 5 displays three magnitudes of a seller’s record, all measured in
number of transactions: T1, “time” to the first negative; T2, “time” between
the first and the second negative; and ET, the estimated interval between
negatives if they are uniformly distributed across a seller’s history. Under the
null hypothesis that negative feedback is generated by a stationary process,
we would expect all three to be equal.
The results suggest that both T1 and T2 are greater than ET, and moreover
27We also experimented with 1 day and 5 day periods. Our results are robust to the
choice of window length.
28We There were only four instances of this in our sample.
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Table 6: Frequency of negative feedback: correcting for selection bias.
T1: Sale-related feedbacks to first negative.
T2: Sale-related feedbacks between 1st and 2nd negative.
All Cat. Thinkpad Eagle Mint Teddy
Sample: sellers with 2+ negatives born after Oct 24, 2002
All sellers Thinkpad Eagle Mint Teddy
T1 196 26.5 175 238 174
T2 80 23.2 37 501 64
T1−T2 116 3.2 138 263 110
T1>T2: p-val 0.03 0.36 0.03 0.22 0.03
N 20 6 5 4 5
Sample: sellers with 1+ negatives born after Oct 24, 2002
All sellers Thinkpad Eagle Mint Teddy
T1 257 26.5 206 403 346
T2* 174 23.2 107 253 277
T1−T2 83 3.2 99 150 69
T1>T2: p-val 0.035 0.36 0.03 0.2 0.04
N 28 6 7 7 8
* T2=T1 for sellers with only 1 negative.
T1 is greater than T2. These differences are not uniformly significant. While
the difference T1−ET is significant at the 5% level for every product, the
difference T1−T2 is not significant for mint coins; and the difference T2−ET is
not significant for the American Eagle coin or the Beanie Baby. Notice however
that, for the most expensive item, the IBM Thinkpad, all three differences are
significant.
The differences are also economically significant. For example, it takes an
average Thinkpad seller 93 sales before the first negative is received; but it
only takes an additional 58 sales (38% less) before the second negative arrives.
One potential problem with the results in Table 5 is the possibility of
sample selection bias. Specifically, we can think of two possible biases. First,
there may be sellers who were born before we started collecting data and
who have exited after an early negative feedback. By excluding these, we
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may overestimate the value of T1. Second, by excluding sellers with one
negative only we may also be biasing our estimate of T2. In order to estimate
the potential for bias from our sampling strategy, we performed a series of
additional calculations, shown in Table 6. First, we redid the calculations
from Table 5 by restricting the sample to sellers born after October 24, 2002,
the date at which we started sampling from eBay. We get different values of
T1, T2, but the difference between T1 and T2 remains significant. This can
be seen in the first panel of Table 6. In particular, when we pool all object
categories, T1>T2 at the 3% significance level. For individual products, we
get no significant difference for the Thinkpad and the Mint coins; but the
number of observations at this level is rather small.
The problem of excluding sellers with one negative only is particularly trou-
bling if they got their negative early on during their lives. Then clearly T2>T1
for those sellers, and their exclusion would bias our test of T1>T2 against the
null T1=T2. In our sample of sellers born after October 24, 2002 who received
negative feedback, 8 out of 28 only had one negative feedback comment only.
Their average T1 is equal to 410; the average number of transactions after the
first negative is 171. These numbers suggest that the exclusion of one-negative
sellers does not imply any significant upward bias in our evaluation of the dif-
ference T1−T2. In the second panel of Table 6, we repeat the calculation in
the first panel by including all sellers with some negative feedback. For the
sellers with one negative comment only we assume T2=T1, consistently with
our null hypothesis. The overall results still suggest that T2>T1 (at the 3.5%
level, when pooling all objects).
In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that T1>T2: it takes fewer trans-
actions to get the second negative than it takes to get the first one. This result
is intriguing. One is naturally led to ask if the change in negative feedback
frequency results from a change in seller behavior or simply a change in the
buyers’ propensity to give negative feedback. We therefore next consider a
series of results to test the hypothesis of buyer behavior.
Suppose that buyers have a threshold of dissatisfaction above which they
give negative feedback. Suppose moreover that this threshold drops after the
first negative. There are several behavioral mechanisms through which this
can happen, and we consider these in turn.
One way in which such a “threshold decline” may occur is through a de-
crease in the cost of writing a negative comment. As we noted above, many
negative comments are followed by a “war of words” between buyer and seller.
Seller retaliation might impose an economic cost on the complaining buyer,
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especially if the buyer is also a seller. Such an effect would confound our re-
sults if the probability of retaliation by a seller in reaction to her first negative
is higher than retaliation to her second negative, an explanation proposed by
several eBay users we talked to.29
To investigate this possibility, we first checked, for every negative or neu-
tral comment-giver in our sample, whether their particular negative comment
was accompanied by a retaliatory negative left by the seller. The result was
striking: of the almost 10,000 negative/neutral instances in our data, 2462
resulted in a retaliatory comment by the seller. It is also interesting to note
that sellers were less likely to retaliate against neutral comments, as opposed
to negatives: we found that a buyer leaving a negative comment has a 40%
chance of being hit back, while a buyer leaving a neutral comment only has a
10% chance of being retaliated upon by the seller.
However, our data indicates that sellers are notmore likely to retaliate upon
their first negative, as opposed to subsequent negatives. In Table 7, we regress
an indicator for retaliation by the seller following a particular negative/neutral
comment on dummy variables for the second through sixth occurrence of such
a comment. As displayed in columns (1) and (2), the dummy variables do not
enter significantly — the seller is not more likely to retaliate against the first
negative comment, as opposed to subsequent negatives. Interestingly, in the
first regression, we find that sellers with higher ex-post percentage of negatives
are more likely to retaliate (the regression coefficient can be interpreted as
saying that a seller with 1% higher n is 4% more likely to retaliate). However, it
does not appear that “fear of retaliation” is a significant driver of the difference
in inter-arrival times of negative comments.
A second variation on the “threshold” story is that, in addition to time
variation, there is also buyer variation in propensity to give negative feed-
back. So first negatives would primarily be given by negative-prone buyers,
whereas subsequent negatives would originate in a wider set of buyers. To test
this possibility, we looked at the string of feedbacks that were left by every
negative/neutral comment giver in our data set.30 We then computed the per-
centage of negative comments that each of these reviewers left about others,
as a measure of each reviewer’s “critical attitude.” In Table 7, columns (3)
and (4), we regress the critical attitude of the reviewer leaving a particular
29We should note that it is not at all clear whether this would play out in an equilibrium
setting. However, since eBay users suggested this as an alternative explanation, we decided
to evaluate its merits.
30On eBay one can also observe what each user wrote about each other.
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Table 7: Alternative explanations for differences in arrival times. Dependent
variable for (1) and (2): buyer’s negative comment was followed by seller’s
negative comment. Dependent variable for (3) and (4): frequency of negative
comments by the buyer who gave a particular negative comment.
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Retaliation Retaliation Profile Profile
2nd Negative 0.016 0.025 0.011 0.011
(0.055) (0.063) (0.013) (0.015)
3rd Negative 0.030 0.043 0.003 -0.003
(0.059) (0.068) (0.015) (0.016)
4th Negative -0.005 0.000 0.020 0.020
(0.064) (0.069) (0.020) (0.021)
5th Negative 0.044 0.118 0.015 0.011
(0.068) (0.074) (0.018) (0.018)
6th Negative 0.053 0.107 0.045 0.040
(0.071) (0.073) (0.023)* (0.024)
Percentage of 4.664 -0.053
Negatives (1.907)** (0.372)
Number of 0.000 -0.000
transactions (0.000) (0.000)
eagle 0.100 (seller f.e.) -0.079 (seller f.e.)
dummy (0.120) (0.038)**
mint 0.000 -0.087
dummy (0.094) (0.037)**
teddy 0.091 -0.071
dummy (0.089) (0.039)*
Constant 0.115 0.239 0.105 0.038
(0.098) (0.045)*** (0.043)** (0.012)***
Observations 558 567 575 584
R-squared 0.03 0.38 0.06 0.38
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels 10, 5, 1 percent
(one to three stars).
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Table 8: Reasons for negative feedback (%).
First Second
Negative Negative
Misrepresented item 22 16
Bad communication 19 20
Item damaged 15 17
Item not received 10 13
Backed out 7 4
Angry / upset 7 7
Overcharged shipping 6 4
Slow shipping 6 10
Bad packaging 4 6
Feedback issues 3 3
Bid on own item 1 1
Total 100 100
negative/neutral comment on dummy variables for the second through sixth
occurrence of a negative/neutral. The regression result tells us that buyers
who left the first negative were not systematically more “critical” than the
buyers who left subsequent negative feedback.31
To conclude our test of the “threshold” story, we directly tested the hy-
pothesis that second negatives have a lower threshold than first negatives. We
constructed a series of pairs of first and second negative comments. We then
asked a third party (a student) to make a subjective evaluation as to which of
the two remarks was more negative.32 The results show that 51% of the second
negatives were considered “nastier” than the corresponding first negative, a
split that is not statistically different from 50/50.
31Interestingly, our data suggests a lower critical threshold for giving negatives in the
Beanie Babies market than in the laptop market: the average negative comment-giver in
the laptop market gave negatives 10% of the time, whereas the average complainant in the
Beanie Babies market complained only 3% of the time. We speculate that this result may
very loosely be attributed to our observation that the Beanie Babies market on eBay can be
seen as a “community of collectors” with frequent repeated interactions, where wrong doings
are less tolerated, whereas transactions in the laptop market are not typically repeated.
32We randomly mixed the order of the comments so that the student could not tell which
was the first, which was the second negative. We also allowed for the following possibili-
ties: “repeat” (remarks are literally identical), “mistake” (remarks are clearly positive even
though a negative was given), and “difficult to tell.”
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Finally, we consider the possibility that buyers are influenced by other
buyers’ behavior (herding, conformism, etc).33 Faced with poor performance
by a seller with a perfect record, a buyer might be inclined to think that there
is no ground for a negative feedback. For example, if there is a communication
problem between buyer and seller, the former may attribute this to a problem
with him or herself, not with the seller. However, if the seller has already
received negative feedback, especially regarding the same problem that the
buyer is now facing, then the buyer may have a greater inclination to attribute
this to a problem with the seller and give negative feedback. This is especially
true for aspects of the transaction that are more subjective and difficult to
input (e.g., communication problems).
To consider this possibility we classified the first and second negative re-
marks according to their nature. The breakdown of the reasons for negative
feedback is presented in Table 8. The buyer influence story should imply an in-
crease in the relative importance of “subjective” problems in second negatives.
However, the results suggest a very similar pattern for first and second neg-
ative (correlation greater than 0.92). Moreover, “item never sent,” arguably
the most objective reason for negative feedback, actually increases in relative
importance (though by a small amount). At the opposite extreme, “bad com-
munication,” arguably the most subjective reason for negative feedback, also
increases in importance (though by an even smaller amount).
In sum, the empirical evidence does not suggest any change in buyer feed-
back behavior following the first negative. Accordingly, we argue the relevant
change is in seller behavior.
4.4 Reputation and exit
In this section, we analyze seller exit behavior. To do so, we supplemented
our data set by revisiting our sample of sellers in the first week of January,
2004, and checking whether they were still in business. There was considerable
attrition in our sample: of the 819 sellers originally sampled in our sweep of the
transaction-level data, we found that 152 had not conducted any transactions
within the last 45 days (pre- and post-Christmas are the busiest seasons on
eBay). We also could not locate the feedback records for 104 sellers in our
sample, since eBay’s database claimed that these seller ID’s were no longer
valid. These two events (not conducting any recent transactions, and not
33There is an extensive psychology literature on this, including Asch (1946), Snyder and
Canto (1979) and Hoch and Ha (1986).
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Figure 3: Predicted exit probabilities.
having a valid eBay ID) constitute our definition of “exit.”
We then ran logit regressions of an “exit” outcome on seller’s observable
reputational statistics as of May 2003 (at the end of our initial sampling pe-
riod). As explanatory variables, we consider (a) the (log) number of negatives
and neutrals and (b) the (log) number of positives.
The regression results are reported in the upper-panel of Table 9, where
we reported our results for the pooled sample of sellers, and also by object
category. The signs of the reputational variables appear to conform with
intuition – sellers with fewer negatives (more positives) are more (less) likely
to exit, though the statistical significance of the number of positives is higher.
To get a sense of the economic significance of the results, in Figure 3 we plot the
predicted exit probability as a function of the (log) total number of positives
that a seller had in May 2003. As can be seen, a variation from 1 to 4 log
points in the number of positives is associated with a decline in exit probability
from 60% to about 20%, implying an economically significant correlation.
Next, we investigate whether the “exits” we see in our data set are accom-
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Table 9: Can reputational variables predict seller exits? Dependent variable:
seller exited by January 4, 2004.
All Exits
All Laptop Gold Silver Beanie
sellers sellers sellers sellers sellers
Log. number 0.34 0.36 0.54 -0.12 0.72
negat. May 03 (0.22) (0.49) (0.42) (0.71) (0.40)*
Log. number -0.58 -0.57 -0.53 -0.87 -0.71
posit. May 03 (0.11)*** (0.23)*** (0.20)*** (0.39)*** (0.19)
Observations 819 199 255 115 250
Opportunistic Exits
All Laptop Gold Silver Beanie
sellers sellers sellers sellers sellers
Log. number 1.02 1.98 3.44 -0.92 -0.09
negat. May 03 (0.40)** (1.09)* (0.99)*** (0.96) (0.73)*
Log. number -0.33 -0.96 -1.09 0.36 0.29
posit. May 03 (0.22) (0.53)* (0.47)** (0.54) (0.38)
Observations 715 174 219 102 220
Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels
10, 5, 1 percent (one to three stars).
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panied by “opportunistic” profit-taking by sellers, and whether reputational
variables can predict such behavior.34 In particular, we looked at the last 25
sale transactions conducted by exiting sellers, and counted the number of neg-
ative comments for these last 25 sale transactions. Some of the examples were
quite striking: one of the sellers in our sample, who had 22755 positives, racked
up 11 negatives in her last 25 transactions; whereas she had a total of 54 neg-
atives in her previous transactions (the percentage of negatives and neutrals
over her overall history was 0.6%, versus 44% in the last 25 transactions). On
average, the percentage of negatives in the last 25 comments of exiting sellers
(excluding those who remained as buyers and those sellers whose ID’s became
invalid, and thus we could not get data) was 4.38%, as opposed to an average
1.61% over their entire histories. This difference is statistically significant at
the 1% level.
To see if reputational statistics as of May 2003 have any predictive power
over such “opportunistic” exits, we repeated the logit regressions in Table
9, where we now defined the dependent variable to be an equal to 1 if the
percentage of negatives within the last 25 transactions of a seller was more than
twice the percentage of negatives within the seller’s entire history. The results
of these regressions are reported in the bottom panel of Table 9. Notice that
although the number of positives that a seller has is still negatively correlated
with the probability of exit, the number of negatives enter into this regression
much more significantly.
Once again, to assess the economic significance of the results, we plot the
predicted probability of “opportunistic” exit, but this time using the (log)
number of negatives as the independent variable. Figure 4 shows that an
increase from 1 log point of May 2003 negatives to 2 log points is associated
with a 10% increase in opportunistic exit probability, once again pointing out
an economically significant relationship.
4.5 Traders’ lifecycle
Casual observation of feedback histories suggests that many sellers appear
to start out as “buyers,” completing a string of purchases before attempting
their first sale. As an example, Figure 4 plots the percentage of sell vs. buy
transactions by user bearsylvania, an established Beanie Baby dealer, as a
function of the number of weeks he has been active on eBay. As can be seen,
34For a model of opportunistic use of reputation, see Phelan (2001). See also Gale and
Rosenthal (1994).
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Figure 5: Becoming a seller: user bearsylvania’s percentage of transactions as
a seller over time.
bearsylvania started out as a buyer first, and quickly changed the pattern of
his transactions from purchases to sales.
To estimate the prevalence of this phenomenon, we looked at the first and
last twenty comments received by each seller. We then defined a seller as
having switched from being a buyer to being a seller if more than 50% of the
first 20 comments referred to purchases, and more than 70% of the last 20
comments referred to sales.35
An important difficulty with implementing the above coding scheme with
our data is that eBay does not report a buyer/seller classification for feedback
comments received prior to June 16, 2001. Since about two-thirds of our
sample sellers began their eBay careers prior to this date, we made our own
assignment as buyer vs. seller based on the textual content of the comments.36
35To check the robustness of this definition of a “switch,” we defined a second indicator
with thresholds 40% and 80%, respectively.
36We automated the classification procedure by first calculating the empirical frequencies
of word-stems such as “buy,” “sell,” “pay,” “ship,” “pack” across buyer/seller categories in
a subsample of the post-June 16,2001 data. We then compared the likelihood of a given
comment to be a “buyer” or “seller” comment based on the presence of these keywords.
The accuracy of our classification of “seller” comments was remarkable: for the post-June
16,2001 data (for which we have eBay’s classifications) we were able to classify all but 117 of
12952 comments correctly. Our classification of “buyer” comments was less accurate, since
29
Given the assumptions that go into our classification scheme, we will report
some of our results for these two subsamples of sellers separately.
We found that 38% of Beanie Baby sellers, 22% of laptop sellers, 31% of
gold coin sellers, and 31% of proof set sellers followed the “buy first, sell later”
strategy (as defined above). We also found that, on average, 81% of a seller’s
last 20 transactions were sales, compared to 46% of the first 20 transactions. A
paired t-test of equality of the two percentages reveals a strongly statistically
significant increase in the percentage of sales (t-statistic equal to 25).37
These results show that “buying first and selling later” is a widespread phe-
nomenon on eBay, and is somewhat more prominent in some object categories
than others. For example, eBay is widely known as one of the main trading
venues for Beanie Babies. It is conceivable that Beanie Baby enthusiasts first
start out as buyers in this market, and switch to selling once they accumulate
an inventory. On the other hand, laptop sellers are more likely to sell items
they have acquired through other channels.
Next, we investigate the correlation of the “buy first sell later” indicator
variable with the (log) number of positives and negatives in the seller’s record.
Column (1) of Table 10 reports the results of a logit regression using all sellers
in the sample for whom we could ascertain the buy/sell breakdown. Column
(2) uses the sample of sellers who joined eBay after June 16, 2001 (i.e., the set
of sellers for whom we have direct data from eBay). Finally, in column (3) of
this table, we look at the subsample of sellers who started their career before
eBay began to report buyer/seller classifications of received feedback (thus we
had to impute these classifications).
The regression yields very similar results across the samples, and appears
to indicate that better sellers (those with many positives and few negatives)
are less likely to have displayed this switching behavior. As can be seen in
most of these buyer comments contain very little information (we checked to see if human
classification performed better in a subsample of comments; the improvement was marginal,
precisely due to the lack of informative content). In particular, we classified 1934 of 5035
“buyer” comments as a “seller” comment, a 60% accuracy rate. Hence, our classification
scheme is biased towards finding “sellers” as opposed to “buyers.” To address this problem,
when computing the percentage of a sales-related comments that a user gets within a given
time period, we add 17% (the average bias in the control sample) on top of the percentage
computed using our classification scheme.
37To make sure that these results were not driven by the assumptions needed to construct
the buyer/seller classification for sellers with missing data, we repeated the same exercise
using the post-June 16, 2001 sample of sellers. We found that, on average, 77% of last
20 transactions were sales, as opposed to 46% of the first 20 transactions. Once again the
paired t-test strongly rejects equality.
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Table 10: Seller’s lifecycle. Dependent variable: seller switched from buying
to selling.
(1) (2) (3)
Log number negatives -0.39 -0.46 -0.36
(0.10)*** (0.20)** (0.11)**
Log number positives 0.33 0.35 0.27
(0.07)*** (0.13)*** (0.10)***
Observations 636 240 396
Sample: 1. Pooled sample.
2. Sellers who joined eBay after June 16, 2001. All
transactions classified as “buy” or “sell” by eBay.
3. Sellers who joined eBay before June 16, 2001. Transactions
were classified using the method described in Section 5.5.
Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels 10, 5, 1
percent (one to three stars).
Figure 6, a change in the log number of negatives from 2 to 5 is associated
with a drop in this switching probability from 30% to 10%, thus the effect
appears economically significant.38
5 Theory implications
Over the past twenty five years or so, a number of economic theories of repu-
tation have been developed. While these theories can be applied to a variety
of situations, we will focus here on the issue of seller reputation. Our goal
is to determine the extent to which the empirical evidence presented in the
previous section can shed light on the validity of economic theory.
For all its variety, the economic theory of reputation can be classified into
a few possible frameworks. One, pioneered by the work of Klein and Leffler
(1981) and Shapiro (1983), sees reputation as a coordination, or bootstrap,
38We also conducted a robustness check on our dependent variable by changing the thresh-
old of being a “buyer” to having less than 40% of transactions as sales, and the threshold of
being a “seller” to having more than 80% of transactions as sales. This modification does
not appear to have an important effect on the coefficient estimates.
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equilibrium in a repeated game context. Here, buyers play an active role in
“punishing” sellers when it is perceived that the latter have not lived up to
expectations. A second framework, pioneered by the work of Kreps, Milgrom,
Roberts and Wilson (1982), models reputation as a Bayesian updating process:
based on the observation of past transactions, sellers form a belief about the
type of seller they interact with.39
In this section, we first present a theoretical framework that we think fits
the empirical observations relatively well. We then consider other alternative
models and discuss their advantages and disadvantages.
A model of eBay reputation dynamics. Our proposed theoretical
framework is in the tradition of Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson’s (1982)
reputation model. Following in part Diamond (1989), we adapt the model to
consider some of the specific features of eBay.
Consider a seller living for T periods and a series of one-period-lived buy-
ers. In each period, a transaction takes place, the outcome of which can be
either positive or negative. Whichever is the case, the transaction’s outcome
is truthfully reported by the buyer and as such becomes public knowledge. So,
in each period a buyer has access to the full history of the seller’s transactions.
Buyers receive a utility 1 when the transaction’s outcome is positive and
zero when it is negative. Buyers are assumed to be risk neutral, and so their
willingness to pay is given by their belief that the transaction’s outcome will
be positive.
The probability that a transaction’s outcome is positive is a function of
seller type, θ, as well as seller effort. For simplicity, suppose the seller can
only be one of two types. A good seller produces a positive transaction with
probability close to one regardless of effort. A bad seller, in turn, has a positive
transaction with probability α if it makes effort (and a cost e) and β < α if
it does not. So, if buyers believe the seller is a good type with probability µ;
and if they believe that, the seller being a bad type, high effort is chosen with
probability ρ; then the buyer is willing to pay
v(µ, ρ) = µ+ (1− µ)
(
ρα+ (1− ρ)β
)
.
Assume that the seller’s payoff is an increasing function of the buyer’s will-
ingness to pay (below we discuss this assumption). In the Appendix, we show
that, if the prior that seller is good, µ0, is sufficiently high; and if the value
39See Cabral (2005) for further discussion of these two alternative approaches.
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of the discount factor is intermediate; then there is a unique Markov equilib-
rium. The equilibrium strategy for a bad seller is to choose high effort while
its record is perfect and switch to low effort once the first negative feedback is
received. The intuition is that, while the seller’s record is perfect, a bad seller
type has a high incentive to pool with the good seller type. Therefore, the
bad seller type makes high effort. Once a first negative feedback is received,
however, the marginal benefit from high effort significantly decreases, as buy-
ers know almost for sure that the seller is bad. Moreover, during the perfect
record phase, buyers keep increasing their belief the seller is good, that is, µ
is increasing in the length of the (perfect) record.
The assumption that the discount factor has an intermediate value is im-
portant. If the discount factor is too small, then there exists no equilibrium
where the low type tries to establish a reputation, that is, effort is always
low. If, on the other hand, the discount factor is very close to one, then a
folk-theorem-type result ensues, that is, there exist many different equilibria.
By contrast, various other simplifying assumptions are not important for
our main qualitative results to hold. In particular, the equilibrium we consider
is not knife-edged, that is, it is robust to a variety of perturbations. For
example, we assume buyers correctly report the outcome of each transaction,
but we could have assumed some probability that a reporting mistake takes
place. Also, we assume only two types of seller, but could have considered a
wider set of types.
Finally, we make the assumption that the seller’s payoff is an increasing
function of the buyer’s willingness to pay. In the Appendix, we present a
simple model of endogenous entry into an auction that has this feature. One
important feature of this model is that, not only is the seller’s payoff increasing
in his reputation, but so is the probability of a sale.
In summary, our model makes predictions that seems to square with key
empirical observations in our dataset. A seller with a perfect record puts a lot
of effort into maintaining that record. Once a negative is received, the marginal
return to investing in reputation decreases dramatically. As a result, the seller
(if a low type) decreases effort. Lower effort leads to lower quality transactions;
and this in turn leads to a higher likelihood of negative transactions (and
negative feedback). In this way, our model is consistent with the following
observations: (a) increasing sales rate during the phase when a seller’s record
is perfect; (b) decrease in price and sales rate following the first negative;
(c) increase in the frequency of negative feedback ensuing the first negative
feedback. Although we don’t observe a decrease in price following the first
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negative (due to lack of data) all other predictions are borne out by our panel.
In the remainder of this section, we consider alternative theoretical models
and the extent to which they fit the stylized facts uncovered in Section 4.
Pure moral hazard. Klein and Leffler (1981) and others have considered
bootstrap equilibria whereby buyers trust sellers will provide high quality so
long as they have done it in the past.40 Once a low quality sale is observed,
buyers “punish” the seller by lowering their expectations regarding quality and
accordingly lowering their demand.41
A pure moral hazard model does a good job at explaining the breakdown of
sales after the first negative. In fact, once a low quality sale is observed, buy-
ers “punish” the seller by lowering their expectations regarding quality. The
model also explains the increase in frequency of negative feedback following
the first negative feedback. Knowing that buyers’ expectations are low, the
seller accordingly makes low effort; and as a result negative feedback occurs
more often.
The pure moral hazard model has two potential problems (which are re-
lated). First, since the cost of creating an identity on eBay is very low, one
would expect sellers to exit following the first negative feedback and start sell-
ing under a different name.42 Second, buyers’ willingness to pay should be the
same before the first negative feedback is received, presumably leading to a
constant sales rate before the first negative arrives.
The issue of free entry can be resolved if there is a significant cost of entering
and starting a new reputation. Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983)
propose money burning in the form of advertising. But advertising does not
play a big role on eBay. Alternatively, low prices can serve as a way to burn
money. We don’t have data on prices, but research by Resnik et al. (2003)
suggests that new sellers receive a significant negative price premium. But on
eBay prices are typically set by buyers, who submit bids, not by sellers.43 It
would be difficult for buyers to coordinate on setting low bids for an object
40See Friedman (1971), Telser (1980) for earlier related work.
41Klein and Leffler (1981) assume quality is a deterministic function of effort, and that
quality is perfectly observable, though ex-post, by buyers. Dellarocas (2003), following ear-
lier work on collusion by Green and Porter (1984) and Porter (1983) on the case of imperfect
observability, suggests a stationary mechanism where poor performance is “punished” by
buyers for a period of time.
42On the issue of changing names at low cost, see Friedman and Resnick (2001).
43In fact, sellers can set minimum bids and “buy now” options. In the limit, a very low
“buy now” option would essentially amount to a low posted price. Still, we believe it is fair
to say that prices are largely determined by buyers.
35
they know is worth a high bid. So, in order for buyers to bid less when the
seller is new, it must be that they expect lower quality. In a pure moral hazard
model, this means that a new seller must start with low effort and gradually
increase it over time. We should therefore observe a non-monotonic path in
negative feedback hazard rates: first decreasing, then increasing. Our data
shows no decrease in hazard rates, though this may result from sample bias.44
A third way of creating an entry cost if for new sellers to start with a
low sales rate and then gradually increase it over time. This is similar to
the idea of “building trust” (see Ghosh and Ray, 1996; Kranton, 1996; Datta,
1997; Watson, 1999 and 2002; Ray, 2002). In an efficient equilibrium, the
seller is indifferent in each period between offering high quality products or
cheat and start a new reputation. This is consistent with the data: initially
increasing output, reduction in sales rate and higher likelihood of exit following
low quality events. The problem with this view is that it requires a tremendous
amount of coordination and monitoring by buyers.
A fourth way of creating an entry cost if for new sellers to start off as buyers.
In fact, our empirical evidence shows that this is indeed the case. Suppose that
buyers lose money by making purchases (including the opportunity cost of
doing it). Suppose that buyers don’t buy from a seller until the latter paid his
“dues” as a new agent. Then restarting a reputation implies a significant cost.
One problem with this view is, again, that it requires a high level of monitoring
on the buyers’ side. In fact anecdotal evidence suggests that buyers do not
distinguish in a seller’s history trades as a buyer and trades as a seller.
Word of mouth effects. In a recent elegant model, Fishman and Rob
(2004) consider an infinite series of one-period lived buyers with word-of-mouth
effects: with some probability, a new buyer meets an old buyer and learns
about the latter’s recent quality experience. The outcome of a transaction is
random and positively related to the seller’s investment. If a buyer has a good
experience with the seller, then the new buyer visits the same seller; if the old
buyer had a bad experience, then the new buyer searches a seller randomly. In
this context, a seller with a series of good transaction outcomes increases his
customer base over time (through word of mouth) and increases his incentives
to invest in quality. In fact, a low quality transaction breaks down the word
of mouth chain and puts the seller back in square zero.
Fishman and Rob’s (2004) model is consistent with our first two empiri-
44A simple non-parametric analysis suggests a distribution of timing of first negative close
to log-normal, certainly not bimodal as would be implied by a non-monotonic hazard rate.
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cal facts: a seller’s transactions rate increases with the length of his (perfect)
record and drastically declines upon receiving a first negative feedback. Notice
the model is also consistent with an increasing price: since the seller’s incen-
tives to invest in quality are increasing in size, which is correlated to age, sale
price starts off at a low level and gradually increases. One important differ-
ence between Fishman and Rob’s (2004) theoretical model and the reality of
eBay is that word-of-mouth effects don’t seem very important on the latter.
However, one can presumably think of a variation of their model that is closer
to the institutional details of eBay and features the same basic intuition.
Pure adverse selection. Consider now the case of pure adverse selec-
tion. Suppose that a seller’s type at time t, θt, is governed by a dynamic
stochastic process.45 In particular, suppose that a seller starts off with a high
value of θ (good type) and that, with some probability, type switches to low
permanently. For example, the seller initially lives close to a UPS shipping
station and for some exogenous reason has to move to a location that is farther
away from a UPS shipping station. Such a shift in seller’s type would lead
not only to the first negative but also to an increased frequency of negative
feedback, consistently with the results in Section 4.3.
The model introduced at the beginning of this section (and formally de-
veloped in the the Appendix), implies that the likelihood an item is sold is an
increasing function of seller reputation.46 Then simple Bayesian updating im-
plies a series of results consistent with the empirical evidence: a seller starts off
selling few products and at a low price; conditional on keeping a good record,
a seller increases both the sales rate and price. Once a negative feedback is
received, both price and sales rate drop. Moreover, subsequent negatives bring
no new information, and so we would expect, as the data suggests, that the
sales rate does not change any further. The rate of negative feedback arrival,
however, increases, since the seller is now of low type.
One problem with the pure adverse selection story is that it would require
that shifts from high type to low type be absorbing. In fact, our results
show the frequency of negative feedback arrival increases in a permanent way
following the first instance of negative feedback. We do not observe instances
45The literature on firm growth and industry evolution frequently considers the possibility
of firm efficiency evolving according to a Markov process. See Hopenhayn (1992), Ericson
and Pakes (1995). More recently, some reputation models have explicitly considered the
possibility of changing types. See Mailath and Samuelson (1998), Phelan (2001).
46The model we present features a buyer’s decision to bid on a product, paying a cost for
doing so. Alternatively, we could consider a seller cost of putting an object up for bid.
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of a decrease in the frequency of negative feedback arrival, as the switch from
low θ to high θ would require.
One justification for this asymmetry is that sellers have a fixed amount
of effort which they must divide among all units they sell. And thus, as
their sales rate increases, effort decreases, leading to the observed increase in
negative feedback frequency.47 One problem with this view is as follows: we
observe that, after the initial shock in sales rate following the first negative,
the sales rate picks up again as the seller becomes older. However, we do not
observe a corresponding increase in the frequency of negative feedback.
Opportunistic exit. One of the most popular stylized facts regarding
the dynamics of reputation is that reputation is slow to build but can be
destroyed very rapidly. In a recent paper, Phelan (2001) proposes a specific
formal model of this phenomenon. He considers a model with adverse selection
and moral hazard. While the model is applied to the issue of government
trust, some of its features can be adapted to the case of eBay. Suppose a
seller can be of two different types: good or bad. A good seller only produces
good transactions; a bad seller produces a good transaction at the cost of
exerting effort. Suppose moreover that a seller’s type evolves stochastically
over time: in each period, a seller changes type with some given probability.
For some parameter values, the optimal strategy for a seller is to produce good
transaction outcomes—even if the seller is bad and must exert effort. As time
goes by, buyers’ beliefs are that the seller is good increase—and so does price.
At some point, however, a bad seller gains more from “cheating” buyers than
by exerting effort. In Phelan’s (2001) model, there is no possibility of “exit”
by changing one’s identity. Exit, however, provides an additional motivation
for the type of opportunistic behavior described in Phelan’s model.
The evidence from exits at eBay seems broadly consistent with the possi-
bility of opportunistic behavior of this kind. Notice however that, once again,
there are two different stories that fit the data. One is adverse selection and
moral hazard, in the line of Phelan (2001). Alternatively, pure adverse selec-
tion with changing types would also do the job. In other words, the string
on negative feedback comments we observe at the end of exiters’ lives can
be interpreted in two different ways. One is that sellers strategically build
up a reputation and then, planning to exit soon, decide to cheat on buyers.
Another interpretation is that, with some probability, a seller’s type changes
to such an extent that (independently of the seller’s actions) a series of neg-
47We are grateful to Steve Tadelis for this interpretation.
38
ative transactions takes place; and, as a result of such unfortunate sequence
of exogenous events, the seller decides to exit. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that opportunistic seller behavior is behind many of the cheat-them-and-leave
episodes; but more research is required in order to tease out the two alternative
interpretations.
Buying a reputation. One of our more robust findings is that traders
typically start off as buyers and then gradually turn into sellers. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that, in many cases such as the IBM Thinkpad, sellers obtain
their products from manufacturers rather than eBay purchases. Consequently,
starting off as a buyer does not seem to be a requirement for the business of
being a seller. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that it is easier to receive
positive feedback as a buyer than as a seller. In other words, it is easier (and
cheaper) to create a good reputation as a buyer than as a seller. Putting these
considerations together, we come to an alternative interpretation of our life
cycle empirical observation, namely that sellers start off as buyers with the
intent of building a reputation that they can then use to sell their product.
The economic theory of reputation does not directly address this issue.
However, Tadelis (1999), Mailath and Samuelson (2001), and others have con-
sidered the problem of buying names (and the associated reputations). Name
trades do not take place at eBay (to the best of our knowledge). Still, the ques-
tion addressed by Tadelis (1999) and Mailath and Samuelson (2001), “Who
wants to buy a reputation?,” seems to apply here as well: what type of seller
has an incentive to start off by investing (as a buyer) on an initial reputation
history? Is it low-type sellers or high-type sellers?
Tadelis (1999) considers two different effects (see Proposition 3). The “rep-
utation maintenance effect” suggests that good types are more likely to buy
a good reputation. The idea is that they can more easily maintain that rep-
utation and therefore can get more out of it. Suppose however that only
good types buy good reputations. Then a bad type would get a great (sig-
nalling) benefit from buying such a reputation. This second effect, which
Tadelis (1999) refers to as the “reputation start-up effect,” works the other
way around. Mailath and Samuelson’s (2001) Proposition 4 suggests that the
value of a reputation is highest for intermediate seller types. In sum, the the-
ory does not seem to have a very clear prediction regarding the coefficients on
the first two rows of Table 10.
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6 Concluding remarks
We may briefly summarize our empirical findings as follows: a typical eBay
seller starts off his record mainly by buying items. Restricting to sales trades,
we observe an increasing sales rate until the first negative is received; and a
substantial drop thereafter. After the first negative we also observe an increase
in the rate of negative feedback. Finally, a typical eBay seller is more likely to
exit the worse his record is; and the last few trades are likely to include more
negative feedback than an average trade during his lifetime.
In general, it is difficult to distinguish between various theoretical mod-
els, including in particular “bootstrap” and “Bayesian” reputation models.48
However, in the particular case of eBay we believe the Bayesian model does
a better job. This still leaves a variety of possibilities, including pure adverse
selection or a combination of adverse selection and moral hazard. More data
may be required to tease these out.
Regardless of which theoretical model best explains the data, an important
conclusion of our paper is that eBay’s reputation system gives way to notice-
able strategic responses from both buyers and sellers. That is, the mechanism
has “bite”. Previous research on eBay has highlighted the impact of repu-
tation on consumer demand (see references in the introduction). Our results
are broadly consistent with this literature but go one step further by stressing
the impact of the feedback mechanism on seller behavior. To the best of our
knowledge, the only other documented evidence of a seller’s response to a rep-
utation mechanism is Jin and Leslie (2004), who study restaurants’ incentives
for hygiene. Specifically, they show the incentives are greater in chain restau-
rants and restaurants frequented by repeat customers, which is consistent with
a dynamic reputation story. Jin and Leslie (2004) and in particular Jin and
Leslie (2003) present evidence that moral hazard plays an important role in
restaurant hygiene: the introduction of hygiene grade cards led to a decrease
in hospitalizations which can be attributed to higher effort by restaurants.49
48Both these reputation mechanisms are consistent with a positive correlation between
reputation and incentives to invest in reputation, as the data suggests. That is, with a
perfect record, reputation is high and the incentives to invest on reputation are high. Once
the first negative arrives, reputation drops significantly, and so do the incentives to invest
on reputation. Since, by assumption, the probability of a positive or negative transaction is
a function of effort, the implication is that the likelihood of negative feedback is much lower
before the first negative is received than after, as our empirical evidence suggests.
49Also related is the work by Abbring, Chiappori, and Pinquet (2003), who develop a
test similar to ours in the context of auto insurance. In the French auto insurance market,
an accident increases the cost of future accidents. An implication of moral hazard is that
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Obviously, the fact the reputation system has bite does not imply that its
current structure is optimal. In fact, we believe an exciting area for future
research is precisely the design of an efficient reputation mechanism.
To conclude, we should mention that our theoretical analysis is based on a
fundamental assumption, namely that buyers offer feedback in a non-strategic
way. A natural next step is thus to study the strategic motives underlying
various agents’ feedback behavior. This we plan to do in a new empirical
project (Cabral, Hortac¸su and Yin, 2005).
the first accident should decrease the arrival rate of future accidents. Abbring, Chiappori,
and Pinquet (2003) fail to find evidence of such decrease in accident rate. By contrast,
in eBay feedback context, our preferred theory predicts that the marginal benefit of effort
decreases when an “accident” (negative feedback) is received; and accordingly the rate of
future “accidents” goes up, as we empirically find to be the case.
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Appendices
A A simple auction model with endogenous
bidder entry
Suppose there are B potential identical bidders, each with valuation v for
the product being auctioned. All B potential bidders simultaneously decide
wether to enter the auction, paying a cost c if they decide to enter and bid.50
We assume bidders play the unique symmetric entry equilibrium. In this
equilibrium, each bidder enters the auction with probability p, where p is
determined by the indifference condition between entering and not entering
the auction. Finally, the bidders that decided to enter simultaneously set
their bids and payoffs are paid.
There are three relevant possible outcomes of the bidder entry game. If two
or more bidders enter, then the seller gets v and each bidder gets zero. If one
or zero bidders enter, then the seller gets zero and the bidder (if there is one)
gets v.51 The entry probability p is thus given by the indifference condition
(1− p)B−1 v = c, or simply
p(v) = 1− B−1
√
c
v
. (1)
The seller’s expected payoff is given by
pi(v) =
(
1−Bp(v)
(
1− p(v)
)B−1 − (1− p(v))B) v. (2)
(The expression in parentheses on the right-hand side is the probability that
there is more than one bidder, the only case when the seller makes a profit.)
Finally, the probability of a sale is given by
σ(v) = 1−
(
1− p(v)
)B
.
Notice that p(v), pi(v) and ρ(v) are all increasing in v.
50See Levin and Smith (1994), Bajari and Hortac¸su (2003). On eBay, this is best thought
of as an opportunity cost. If a bidder is only interested in buying one object she will avoid
bidding for several objects at the same time.
51We implicitly assume that the seller’s object is perishable. A possible extension is to
assume that an unsold object has value vU to the seller.
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B A model with adverse selection and moral
hazard
In this appendix, we present a simple model of seller reputation dynamics.
This model includes some of the features of the models in Kreps, Milgrom,
Roberts and Wilson (1982), Diamond (1989). First, we make the following
assumptions regarding buyer behavior:
Assumption 1 A transaction has two possible outcomes: successful or un-
successful, with consumer benefit equal to 1 and 0, respectively.
More generally, we could assume that consumer benefit is given by ω and
ω, respectively. However, with no loss of generality we assume ω = 1 and
ω = 0. Another possible extension is that the outcome is continuous and the
transaction considered successful if the outcome is above some critical value.
Assumption 2 A successful transaction is reported with probability one as a
successful transaction. An unsuccessful transaction is reported with probability
one as an unsuccessful transaction.
All of the relevant results can be extended to the case when there is a small
probability of error in feedback or a less than 100% feedback rate. However, the
analysis becomes substantially more complicated. A more crucial assumption
we need is that the probability and accuracy the feedback be independent of
the seller and of the seller’s history. Following eBay’s terminology, we refer
to a successful transaction as a “positive,” or simply P ; and an unsuccessful
transaction as “negative,” or simply N .
Assumption 3 Buyers are risk neutral.
Given Assumption 1, Assumption 3 implies that willingness to pay is simply
the expected probability of a P transaction.
Our model combines elements of adverse selection and moral hazard. It
is similar in structure to Diamond’s (1989) model of reputation acquisition in
credit markets.52 Although the context in which we apply it is quite different,
the basic mechanism is the same. In his model, the informed party is a firm
who knows its type and must choose effort level. The uninformed parties
52Diamond’s model, in turn, builds on the earlier work of Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and
Wilson (1982), Kreps and Wilson (1982), Milgrom and Roberts (1982). See also Ho¨lmstrom
(1999) for a related model featuring similar dynamics.
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are lenders, who must determine the interest rate. In our formulation, the
informed party is a seller who knows her type and must choose effort level.
The uninformed parties are the buyers, who must determine whether to bid
and, if so, how much to bid.
Specifically, we assume that each seller can be of two types. A good seller
always produces P transactions. A bad seller produces a P transaction with
probability α < 1 at an effort cost e or with probability β < α at no effort
cost. Let µ0 be the buyers’ prior belief that the seller is good. Each seller lives
for an infinite number of periods and discounts the future according to the
discount factor δ. In each period, the seller auctions one unit with a second
price auction with no secret reserve price or minimum bid.53
On the buyer’s side, we assume that, in each period, there are B potential
identical bidders who live for one period. Each bidder has a valuation given
by
v(µ, ρ) = µ+ (1− µ)
(
ρα+ (1− ρ)β
)
, (3)
where µ is the posterior belief that the seller is good and ρ is the belief that the
seller, being bad, will make an effort to improve transaction quality. Basically,
v(µ, ρ) is the buyers’ expected probability of a P transaction: with probability
µ, the seller is good, in which case P happens with probability one; with
probability 1 − µ, the seller is bad, in which case the outcome is P with
probability α or β, depending on whether the seller exerts effort (probability
ρ) or not (probability 1− ρ).
As in Appendix A, we assume potential buyers must pay a cost c in order
to bid. We further assume that bidders play the unique symmetric entry
equilibrium. The results from Appendix A apply, where v is now given by (3).
We now turn to the characterization of the seller’s equilibrium strategy.
We do so in the context of the following important assumption, which we will
maintain throughout:
Assumption 4 e
βe+(α−β)(pi(1)−pi(β)) < δ <
e
βe+(α−β)(pi(α)−pi(β)) .
In words, we assume that the value of the discount factor, δ, is intermediate.
A very high value of the δ implies that there is a multiplicity of equilibria. In
fact, for δ sufficiently close to one any feasible, individually rational payoff
profile is attainable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game. A very low
53A straightforward extension is to assume the seller puts an object up for auction at an
exogenously given rate, independent of its type.
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value of δ, in turn, implies that there is only one equilibrium, one where the
(bad) seller never exerts effort.
The following result characterizes a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this
game. This result is different from Diamond’s (1989), who considers a finitely
lived seller. However, the basic intuition is the same, namely, the idea that
reputation and effort are “correlated” in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
1. After the first N , the buyers’ willingness to pay decreases.
2. After the first N , the seller chooses low effort.
3. There exists a t′ such that the seller chooses high effort if he has a perfect
record longer than t′.
Proof: Consider first the case when the seller’s history includes an N .
Bayesian updating implies µ = 0, where µ is the posterior that the seller
is good. The only possibility of an equilibrium where the seller chooses high
effort is one where an N is punished by never believing the seller will choose
high effort again, ρ = 0. Such a punishment implies a discounted profit of
pi(β)/(1− δ), where β is the buyer’s willingness to pay a bad seller who does
not exert effort.
If instead buyers expect the seller to choose high effort, that is ρ = 1,
then the seller’s expected payoff from high and low effort, assuming maximal
punishment, is given by
V H = pi(α)− e+ αδV H + (1− α)δpi(β)/(1− δ)
V L = pi(α) + βδV H + (1− β)δpi(β)/(1− δ).
Straightforward computation shows that the condition V L > V H is equivalent
to δ < e
βe+(α−β)(pi(α)−pi(β)) . It follows that the only equilibrium following an N
is low effort.
Consider now the case of a bad seller with a perfect record. Bayesian
updating implies that µ > µ0 ≈→ 1. In the limit when µ = 1, the seller’s
expected payoff from high and low effort is given by
V˜ H = pi(1)− e+ αδV H + (1− α)δpi(β)/(1− δ)
V˜ L = pi(1) + βδV H + (1− β)δpi(β)/(1− δ).
Straightforward computation shows that the condition V H > V L is equivalent
to δ > e
βe+(α−β)(pi(1)−pi(β)) .
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The above calculations imply that ρ declines as the first N appears. More-
over, Bayesian updating implies that µ drops from a positive value to zero.
We thus conclude that v decreases as the first N is given.
We should note that Proposition 1 is not a knife-edged result: following the
steps of the proof, one can see that continuity arguments apply if we assume
that a good type produces a P with probability γ lower than, but close to,
one. In fact, below we consider an extension of the basic model where γ is
strictly less than one.
Having said that, we should restate that the result depends crucially on
the particular values of δ we consider. If δ is very high, then the folk theorem
applies: any equilibrium path that is feasible and individually rational is the
result of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for a high enough value of the discount
factor δ. In other words, if the discount factor is high enough, then equilibrium
theory has no predictive power. At the other extreme, if δ is very low then
there is a unique equilibrium where the seller chooses low effort in every period.
Points 1 and 2 in Proposition 1 still hold true, but not Point 3.
The results above have various empirical implications. In particular, they
imply that (a) the sales rate decreases after the first negative; (b) the negative
feedback arrival rate increases upon the first negative (c) both the sales rate
and the frequency of negative feedback remain constant after the first negative.
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